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T
his year, the Nobel committee decided to award Oliver E. Williamson
for his contribution to the understanding of the boundaries of the ﬁrm.
What is a ﬁrm? What activities should be internalized ? Which ones
should be externalized? Which ones should be mixed (i.e. internalized and
externalized)? What is the speciﬁc coordination device that is available in a
ﬁrm and not on a market ? In my opinion, these questions are old and still unre-
solved and the article written by Jacques Crémer (in the previous issue of this
review) is helpful to delineate the challenges still to be addressed.
In this article, Jacques Crémer points out that in order to build a convincing
theory of the ﬁrm, we need to be able to delineate what ﬁrms can achieve that
markets cannot and inversely, what markets can achieve that ﬁrms cannot.
Otherwise, the « selective intervention » puzzle applies suggesting that in any
situation, a ﬁrm can outperform a market. Jacques Crémer suggests that, if a
satisfying theory of the ﬁrm does not yet exist, many studies are on the right
path using a new and common « strategy », coming from a « change of the des-
cription of the role of the principal » that is « the principal does not leave the
stage once the contract is written ». I totally agree with this. However, I will
argue that this does not come as a surprise once you seriously consider Ronald
H. Coase’s papers on transaction costs. The new theoretical paths that impro-
ve our understanding of what the ﬁrm is and what its limits are, all have in
common that they try to incorporate transaction costs in their analysis. This is
the main seminal spirit of Coase’s papers and this naturally leads to consider
that any contractual issues cannot be resolved when they involve a Principal
that would leave the stage once the contract is written.
I. — TakIng Coase serIously
Like Jacques Crémer, I used to teach about the Organization Theory. And the
ﬁrst message I tried to pass along to my students was that without transaction
costs, organizational issues are irrelevant. That is, from my point of view, they
rely on the main value of Coase’s famous articles on the nature of the ﬁrm
(Coase (1937)) and the problem of social costs (Coase (1960)). What is cen-
tral in these articles is not so much stressing the existence of transaction costs :
everyone knows that such costs exist. Also, it is not (and this is often very
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confusing for students) to critique the standard neoclassical theory : every
theory is a simpliﬁcation of the real world and the standard neoclassical theo-
ry is no exception and did well to highlight our understanding of the many eco-
nomic questions concerning the way markets perform. The main value of
Coses’s articles is to argue that, without a theoretical framework including
transaction costs, we cannot address the question of why a ﬁrm exists, what
their boundaries should be and more generally, all the questions related to
governance structures’ issues. This is the message of the Coase Theorem
(Coase (1960)), in a world without transaction costs, you do not care about
alternative governance structures, organizational choices and the way proper-
ty rights are distributed. At the end of the day, scarce resources will be used the
same way.
In my opinion, the selective intervention puzzle is another face of the same
coin : without transaction costs you can negotiate and reach (atleast) a situation
where you integrate a transaction that is unchanged compared to before inte-
gration, suggesting that ﬁrms outperform markets in all situations. Of course,
once transaction costs exist this is no longer true.
With this starting point, it becomes clear that if you want to handle organi-
zational questions such as the make or buy issues and the boundaries of the
ﬁrms, you must build on a theoretical framework that allows for the existence
of such transaction costs. You must relax the assumptions of the neoclassical
theory (1). Several frameworks are possible candidates. All of them, of cour-
se, suggest that the Principal does not leave the stage once the contract is writ-
ten and insist on the fact that, in a complex world, all agreements are usually
incomplete and must evolve through time.
II. — The « seleCTIve InTervenTIon » Puzzle
The standard incentive theory to which Jacques Crémer refers departs from
the standard neoclassical theory by relaxing assumptions concerning the dis-
tribution of information. More precisely, making the assumption that informa-
tion is asymmetric, the theory provides new insights into the consequences and
how to deal with adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Nevertheless,
this is not sufficient in order to bring transaction costs into the analysis and
thus to resolve the selective intervention puzzle. As Malin and Martimort
(1) I also like to point out to my students that in such a theoretical framework, many market fai-
lures vanished, such as natural monopolies, for example. Indeed, as soon as there are no tran-
saction costs – as it is supposed in standard neoclassical textbooks – consumers might free-
ly negotiate with the monopoly in order to set aside payments to convince the monopoly to
behave such as if competition existed. And this would lead to a win-win game. Of course, as
soon as you consider the existence of transaction costs, coordination is an issue for consu-
mers, as well as enforcement of side payments.
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(2000) noted, « incentive theory has nothing to say about such things as the
distribution of authority within an organization, the limits of the ﬁrm, the sepa-
ration between the public and the private spheres of the economy, and more
generally nothing to say about organizational forms and designs ».
Nevertheless, such an approach provides us with the second best solution.
Third best optimizations that describe a world in which the Irrelevance
Theorem no longer holds is possible when ad hoc transactional constraints are
introduced.
As pointed out by Jacques Crémer, other theoretical frameworks go a step
further, by relaxing other assumptions helping transaction costs to make their
appearance. I will not give an extensive description of alternative theoretical
frameworks (see Garrouste and Saussier (2005) and Gibbons (2005) for more
on this topic). The incomplete contract theory (Grossman and Hart (1986)) is
obviously one of the main candidates, making the assumption that contractual
agreements are incomplete because of institutional imperfections making
contractual provisions unveriﬁable and then leading contracting parties to
renegotiate once unveriﬁable investments have been made. The relational
contracting literature (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (1994), Baker, Gibbons,
and Murphy (2002)) completes the picture by taking into account that the
contracting parties might cooperate through promises instead of formal
contractual agreements once the future business restrains opportunistic beha-
vior. Furthermore, this approach argues that property rights are a bunch of
revenue and decision rights, some of which are transferable through contracts,
others are not explaining in part why integration changes things regardless of
the willingness of the parties (Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2008)). 
In all cases, because of existing transaction costs, contracting is no longer an
ex ante issue, where the Principal must ﬁnd incentive mechanisms in order to
select and to give proper incentives to his agent. But it is also almost an ex post
issue, in a transaction costs’ world in which the contracting parties sign incom-
plete contracts that must be adapted to a changing environment.
III. — Is The Puzzle already resolved?
Oliver E. Williamson proposed a solution to the « selective intervention »
puzzle : The ﬁrm, with its distinctive capabilities, is able to govern transactions
of particular kinds for which markets are not suitable, by controlling more
strongly opportunistic behaviors and transaction costs that may arise as soon
as economic actors are in a dependency relationship. However, such control is
at the expense of high transaction costs coming from a loss of incentive inten-
sity (e.g. bureaucratic costs). Thus there is no selective intervention puzzle
since two things change automatically when one ﬁrm integrates another ﬁrm:
the distribution of property rights and the incentive levels.
I see several problems with this solution. One of the main problems is that if
there is an analysis of the limits of the markets (i.e. the sources of transaction
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costs), I do not see a counter part concerning the ﬁrms in the transaction cost
economics framework. Where are the bureaucratic costs coming from? There
is a need for a clearer understanding of the limits of the ﬁrms to properly solve
the selective intervention puzzle. As noted by Williamson, transaction cost
economics mainly look at transaction costs on the market, making the assump-
tion that « substantially the same factors that are ultimately responsible for
market failures also explain failures of internal organization » (Williamson
(1973), page 316 ; Williamson (1996)). 
I agree with Jacques Crémer that I would feel more conﬁdent with a more
« uniﬁed » theoretical framework. I follow Oliver Hart’s path in stating that « It
would be too easy to construct a theory of the ﬁrm with the assumption that
incentives are decreasing in the ﬁrm compared to the market » (Hart (1995)).
And I applaud the theoretical paths that try to solve the puzzle with more for-
mal foundations, specifying the precise assumptions that are needed to build a
theory of the ﬁrm. As far as I can see, they are giving rise to interesting stories
that are clearly in competition with each other when considering make or buy
issues (Whinston (2003)) or contracting choices (Masten and Saussier (2000)).
At the end of the road, we can bet that such « competition » between existing
theories of the ﬁrm will increase our understandings of those issues and will
lead to a uniﬁed theory.
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